Issue 4(12) /2014


ed. by Leszek Kopciuch, Tomasz Siwiec


From the Editorial Board fulltext.pdf (in English)

Leszek Kopciuch, Tomasz Siwiec, Introduction fulltext.pdf (in English)

A R T I C L E S:

Hans Lenk, Lebensformen in Schemaspielen – und umgekehrt fulltext.pdf (in German with summary in English and Polish)

The article outlines the concept methodological schematic interpretationism, adhered to by its aouthor; this is connected with Wittgensteinian philosophy of language games and life forms: schema games extend and establish the notion of language play; they can also – by means of life forms and lifeworlds – provide better grounds for effective interpretations:

Keywords: Wittgenstein, language games, life forms, lifeworld, schema games

Gérard Raulet, Lebenswelt als politisch relevanter Begriff fulltext.pdf (in German with summary in English and Polish)

The semantic field of the notion of the „lifeworld” extends onto ontology („being-in-the-world”), anthropology biology, life sciences in general, as well as sociology. Meanwhile, however, is another, journalistic and inflationary, usage of the term spread in everyday life, which in a way confirms its informal, „lifelike” character. This is both a strength and a weakness. That’s exactly why the Husserlian notion has been accused of being vague or downright contradictory. Indeed, it means a horizon of horizons, and in every instance a personal horizon, one of my own, which connects me, in my being-here, with the horizons of others. The present text departs from the observation that the Husserlian notion involves since the beginning a culture-critical as well as a science-critical potential, and that the appearance of direct obviousness that is so typical of the reference to the lifeworld quickly turns out a reaction to a crisis, and specifically a loss of transparency. It attempts to examine the relation between the notion of the lifeworld to politics and tests its analytical usefulness.

Keywords: lifeworld, politics, Husserl, Habermas, Luhmann

Friedo Ricken SJ, Die Hoffnung und das gute Leben. Überlegungen im Anschluss an Platon und Thomas von Aquin fulltext.pdf (in German with summary in English and Polish)

Hope is a necessary condition of a good life, and a good life provides a basis for hope. Saint Thomas Aquinas distinguishes between hope as an emotion and hope as a virtue. The emotion of hope is a sensual quest, whose object is defined by four features: (a) it is a good; hope is thus distinct from fear, which refers to an evil; (b) it is a future good; hope is thus distinct from joy, which refers to a present good; (c) it is a good difficult to obtain; hope is thus distinct from desire; (d) despite difficulty, this good is obtainable; hope is thus distinct from despair. The virtue of hope is an attitude of the will, or a spiritual quest. The object of hope is a future good, which is attainable although with difficulty. Something is attainable for ourselves, or through ourselves, or through others. If we have hope that something is attainable for us with divine help, hope rests in God.

Keywords: hope, Plato, Thomas Aquinas, good, the virtue of hope, the emotion of hope

Oliver Hallich, A Plea Against Apologies fulltext.pdf (in English with summary in German and Polish)

Apologies and forgiveness are closely related. A wrongdoer, by offering his apologies, asks for forgiveness; the victim, by accepting them, grants it. In this talk, I aim at a normative assessment of apologies: what, if anything, gives us the right to ask the victim of our wrongdoing for forgiveness? After some conceptual clarifications, I attempt to lay open a paradoxical structure inherent in apologies. Apologies are made in a spirit of humility: if the offender recognises his guilt he will see the victim’s negative emotions towards him as proper and justified. Nevertheless, by begging for forgiveness, he tries to change the victim’s negative feelings towards him. Thus, by apologising, the offender tries to bring about a state of affairs which, if genuinely repentant and remorseful, he has no reason to want to bring about. In what follows I examine various attempts to dissolve this paradox. These include offering reasons for apologising that are independent of our wish to alter the victim’s feelings of resentment. I discuss four suggestions made in the literature on forgiveness, namely (i) that the offender wants to signal to the victim his feelings of regret, (ii) that he wants to regain his self-esteem, (iii) that he wants to regain his moral stature, and (iv) that he wants to indicate a separation between himself as a person and the act he has done. None of these suggestions, however, is persuasive. In sum, attempts to dissolve the paradox of apologies fail. An offender who recognises his own guilt and truly subjects himself to the victim’s judgement has no rational reason for asking for forgiveness. In many cases, not offering one’s apologies is a sign of taking guilt seriously. We should then see the refusal to ask for forgiveness as a virtue rather than as a vice.

Keywords: Apologies, forgiveness, excuses, resentment

Katie Terezakis, To Philosophize is to Revise, Or, How German Idealism Became Historical in the Work of One Secluded American Thinker fulltext.pdf (in English with summary in German and Polish)

In the works of relatively unknown twentieth century American thinker, John Wil-liam Miller, Kantian idealism is both utilized and transformed into a historical, linguistically focused philosophy of symbolic action. I argue that Miller’s system should be understood as native to the detranscendentalizing project of philosophical modernity as well as to concerns about German idealism that typify early American philosophy. I link Miller’s methodology to a metacritical assessment of Kant’s work that is nearly as old as the first Critique; I also link Miller’s approach to concerns about human action and agency that characterize the pragmatist tradition. I make the case that Miller revises the Kantian project, and the notion of regulative ideality in particular, with his presentation of a “midworld of functioning objects”. The Millerian midworld, I maintain, demonstrates the historically and linguistically contextual establishment of cognitive categories, including the Kantian forms of intuition. In so doing, Miller demonstrates what a genuinely critical philosophy must look like and he sidesteps difficulties regarding fallibilism and finitude, which continue to reappear in contemporary theorizing. Miller sees philosophy as an utterly historical, ongoing work of revision; he also shows how other forms of human endeavoring do well to return to philosophy to address the problems that have come to define them. Miller’s system aptly demonstrates both the historicity of critical philosophy and the practical application of a working philosophical methodology to contemporary dilemmas.

Keywords: John William Miller, Immanuel Kant, Jürgen Habermas, Johann Georg Hamann, Idealism, Actualism, Pragmatism, Metacriticism, Midworld of Functioning Objects

R E V I E W S:

Leszek Kopciuch, O wielości globalizacji. Review: Adam Nobis, Globalne procesy, globalne historie, globalny pieniądz, Wyd. UWr, Wrocław 2014 fulltext.pdf (in Polish)

Cezar Jędrysko, O idei rosyjskiej raz jeszcze – aktualnie i dobrze. Review: Paweł Rojek, Przekleństwo imperium. Źródło rosyjskiego zachowania, Wydawnictwo M, Kraków 2014 (120 s.) fulltext.pdf (in Polish)

R E P O R T S :

Tomasz Siwiec, Moralność – między teorią a światem przeżywanym, Toruń, 25 września 2014 fulltext.pdf (in Polish)

Licencja Creative Commons